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(E). The final question to be considered concerns the effect of state
law under the Erie doctrine on the administration of the subsection.
Suppose the plaintiff sues in a district court where the law of the state
in which it sits requires, on the alleged facts, a judgment for the plaintiff
under the Erie rule; and the defendant moves for a transfer under
§1404(a) to a district court in a state whose law is such that the de-
fendant would win. Assuming transfer is granted, what law should the
transferee forum apply? There are at least three cases40 to the effect
that the law of the transferring district applies, and that a change of
venue affects the place of trial only. Or, in the terse language of the
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, when a removed case4" is trans-
ferred from a New Mexico district court to a California district court
under §1404(a), "there is no logical reason why it should not remain
a New Mexico case, still controlled by the law and policy of that state."
Although this result places upon a transferee district court the addi-
tional burden of deciding each transferred case under a foreign law,
this is an easier task than that which would be forced upon the court
having to decide the question of transfer if the law of the transferee
district were held to control. In this latter situation, if the motion was
to transfer to a district in a state having a public policy opposed to that
of the state of the instant district, the trial judge would have the un-
happy duty of determining the propriety of defeating one state's policy
and applying another.47 Finally, if the law of the transferee district
were to control, this would undoubtedly encourage a defendant to "shop
around" the states of proper venue for the best state law available be-
fore moving for a transfer on the grounds of inconvenience. This, of
course, runs counter to one of the reasons for which the Erie rule was
adopted. Wisdom clearly lies with the existing law.
DON EVANS.
Federal Jurisdiction-Interpleader-Cross-Claims
Plaintiff insurance company (a disinterested stakeholder) brought
an interpleader action to determine the proper recipient of an escrow
fund placed in its possession by one of the 'defendant-claimants. The
suit was instituted in the United States District Court for Southern
"'Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 182 F. 2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950);
Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F. 2d 866 (2d Cir.
1950); Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410 (D. N. M. 1949).
'" The removal of an action by a defendant to the federal court is no waiver
of his right to move for transfer under §1404(a). White v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp.
411 (N. D. Ill. 1948); Stewart v. Atchison T. &. S. F. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 172(E. D. Mo. 1949); Chaffin v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 80 F. Supp. 957 (E. D. N. Y.
1948).
," See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941) (fact situation where disregard
of policy of transferring state would be clearly substantive).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
California under the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936.1 The two
claimants, one a citizen of California (hereinafter called C-i) and the
other, a corporation of Arizona (hereinafter called C-2) had made ad-
verse claims on plaintiff for the full amount of the fund.2  C-2 was
served in Arizona under authority given for nation-wide service in
interpleader actions. 3 He neither answered nor appeared, and the court
awarded the fund to C-1. Meanwhile C-1 had filed a cross-claim against
C-2 for money damages contending that this was permissible under
Rule 13(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since the cross-
claim grew out of the same contract which had given rise to the escrow
fund.4  C-2 appeared specially and objected to the court's jurisdiction
over it regarding the cross-claim. 5 The court dismissed the added con-
troversy and on appeal the dismissal was affirmed.8
The majority of the court, apparently not satisfied with stating the
law applicable to the facts before them, went far beyond the necessities
of the case and said: "It would be a startling conclusion, we think, to
give to Rule 13(g) and the Interpleader statute the effect of enlarging
the jurisdiction of a.court to create rights going beyond those to the
fund which is the subject of the interpleader action."P7
Since C-2 had defaulted on the interpleader action and had not
appeared (other than specially), there is little ground for argument so
far as the actual holding of the case is concerned.8 However, there is
28 U. S. C. §1335 (1948).
' Professor Z. Chafee, Jr., in his article, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of
1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377 (1940) says, "The main purpose of the Federal Inter-
pleader Act of January 20, 1936, was to give the United States courts power to
protect any stakeholder who was threatened with conflicting claims asserted by
citizens of different states."
28 U. S. C. §2361 (1948).
'Rule 13 (g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states "A pleading may
state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action
or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter
of the original action. .. ."
As pointed out in Stitzel-Weller Distillery v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W. D.
Ky. 1941) the civil process of a Federal District Court does not run outside the
district, and service outside the district is void except where specifically author-
ized by a Federal statute. The court also points out that, although the Interpleader
Act will confer jurisdiction over those served outside the district with respect to
their claims against the subject matter of the interpleader, it does not confer
jurisdiction over those defendants for purposes of a personal judgment.
Rule 4(f) provides for service anywhere within the state in which the district
court sits.
'Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950).
'Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502, 503 (9th Cir. 1950).
S "A special appearance, while not regarded as an appearance at all for some
purposes, is one which is made for the sole purpose of objecting to the juris-
diction of the court over the person of defendant." Hale v. Campbell, 40 F. Supp.
584 (N. D. Iowa 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 127 F. 2d 594 (8th Cir. 1942).
"By repeated decisions in this Court it had been adjudged that the presence of
the defendant in a suit in personain . . .is an essential element of the jurisdiction
of a district court .. . and that in the absence of this element the court is power-
less to proceed to an adjudication." Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299
U. S. 374 (1937).
1950]
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ground on which to question the breadth of the language quoted above.
Especially is this true if such language has as its only basis a restrictive
attitude regarding the controversial question of permitting adjudication
of other matters than the res at the second stage of interpleader.9
The first ground for criticism is that set forth in the concurring
opinion of the principal case: It is simply that the fact situation which
was before the court did not call for a 'determination of the question of
whether the Interpleader Act and Federal Rule 13(g) could ever be
used in conjunction to secure jurisdiction over a defendant-claimant to a
cross-claim. The opinion suggests that an entirely different problem
might have been before the court had there been any necessity for a
determination of the claimants' rights and obligations under the escrow
instructions which had set up the fund. 10
A second ground upon which to question the broad language of the
majority is found in Bank of Neosho v. Colcord," a prior decision by a
district court. In that case both claimants had formally asserted their
claims in the fund which was the subject of the interpleader action.
One of the defendant-claimants had filed a cross-bill for specific per-
formance of the contract which had given rise to the entire proceeding.
The court refused the other defendant's motion to dismiss the cross-bill
for lack of jurisdiction. The basis for refusal was solely that the subject
matter of the cross-claim arose out of the transaction that was the sub-
ject matter of the original action. This court, taking an opposite view
from the position set forth in the principal case said, "Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 22, 28 U. S. C. A., provides inter alia that all
actions of interpleader 'shall be conducted in accordance with' the Rules
of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Federal District Courts. The
effect of such provision in Rule 22, is to make said Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and particularly Rule 13(g) relating to cross-claims against
co-parties, applicable to interpleader actions.' 1
2
The majority opinion in the principal case distinguishes the Neosho
case on the valid ground that the parties had already appeared to claim
the fund deposited by the stakeholder. But then, apparently in support
of its own attitude, the opinion states, "But the court in that case
[Neosho] gave broader scope to Rule 13(g) than we think proper."1 3
9 A strict interpleader action may be said to have two stages. The first in-
cludes the plaintiff and all defendant-claimants; the second includes only the
defendant-claimants, the plaintiff having dropped out. During this second stage
the court decides which of the claimants is entitled to the res, or thing, which
was the subject of the interpleader.
"
0See Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502, 505 (9th Cir.
1950) (concurring opinion).118 F. R. D. 621 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
12 Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F. R. D. 621, 622, 623 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
"See footnote 6 in Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502, 506
(9th Cir. 1950).
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The only other &iecisions cited by the majority opinion are one Eng-
lish case, 14 and Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman. 5 The
Neosho case distinguished the Stitzel case by saying that there the court
was not concerned with the effect of Rule 13(g) on interpleader pro-
ceedings.1 6 Whether this is accepted as completely accurate or not, it
can safely be said that the Stitzel case does not stand for the proposition
that a district court could not, under any circumstances, be faced with
a situation in which the combination of the Interpleader statute and
Rule 13(g) would confer jurisdiction over a cross-claim arising in the
second stage of an interpleader action between defendant-claimants of
different states.17
The most recent federal case in which there appears an objection to
the court's jurisdiction over a cross-claim defendant in the second stage
of interpleader is Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery.18 In this case
plaintiff insurance company, a Pennsylvania firm, brought interpleader
to settle claims made upon it for the insured value of an airplane which
had crashed while in possession of a lessee (Coastal Airlines). Both the
owner, who was a citizen of Arkansas, and the lessee claimed the in-
surance, the owner cross-claiming against the lessee for back rent on the
contract of lease which also included the option to buy. At trial the
claimants stipulated the questions to be decided. They were: (1)
Whether the lessee had exercised his option to buy, and (2) whether
lessee owed lessor any rent. After the decision went for the lessor on
both points, the lessee appealed on grounds, among others, that the
District Court of Arkansas had no jurisdiction over the cross-claim.
The court of appeals held, after quoting extensively from the principal
case, and considering the Neosho and Stitzel cases, that the stipulations
and lack of objection waived any objections the lessee might have raised
to venue, or to jurisdiction over the person. This case, as pointed out
in the opinion, is clearly distinguishable from both the principal case
and the Neosho case, but if the decision could be said to lean in either
direction it seems to be toward the Neosho case.' 9
2 Eschger, Ghesquirer and Co. v. Morrison, Kekewich and Co., 6 T. L. R.
145 C. A. 1890).
2S 39 F. Supp. 182 (W. D. Ky. 1941). So far as is determinable, this is the
only other federal case on the point which had been decided prior to the principal
case.2' Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F. R. D. 621, 624 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
' The Stitzel case does, however, stand for what the court cited it (the precise
point) ; and on the same reasoning. There the court stressed the point that since
the cross-claim defendants had not appeared there could be no jurisdiction of the
person conferred by the Interpleader statutes as regards personal judgments on
cross-claims. Rule 13(g) was not specifically mentioned.
18180 F. 2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950).
In language strikingly similar to that found in the Neosho case the court
said. "Both claims arose 'out of the transaction or occurrence' which was 'the
subject matter ... of the original action' within the meaning of Rule 13(g) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 180 F. 2d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1950).
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An extensive argument has been made in favor of permitting the
trial judge to exercise his discretion in deciding whether added con-
troversies should be decided between the defendant-claimants at the
second stage of interpleader.20 One of the most appealing reasons given
in support of this solution is that such a policy would be in the 'spirit'
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a spirit which would ". . . ad-
judicate all phases of litigation involving the same parties .. and avoid
multiplicity of suits .... -21
Whether the solution offered in the aforementioned argument is ever
accepted, the very existence of such an argument by such a highly re-
spected writer should be sufficient to demonstrate that the problem does
not lend itself to solution by any blanket rule. In the absence of
clarity on the point under the Federal Rules, perhaps the best solution
is for the courts to restrict their decisions to the facts before them; and
not attempt in one stroke to eliminate all possibility of claimants ever
combining Rule 13(g) and the Federal Interpleader Act to secure settle-
ment of cross-actions between themselves.
PAUL A. JOHNSTON.
Federal Jurisdiction-Political Question-Justiciability
of Political Rights
M a working hypothesis for carrying out the doctrine of "separation
of powers" which is implicit in the Constitution,' the United States
Supreme Court early adopted the "political question" guide.2 That is,
when the issue is one on which final decision rests with the executive
or legislative branches, the Court will not take jurisdiction. The con-
troversy is non-justiciable, for the reason that it is a question for the
"political departments" and not for the judiciary to decide.3 It is
20 Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 HARv. L.
Rav. 929 (1943).21 H. F. G. Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 7 F. R. D. 654, 656 (N. D. Ill.
1947). Rule 1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states "... . They [the Rules]
shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.' Although Rule 82 forbids any construction of the Federal Rules
which would extend the jurisdiction of the district courts, it is by no means certain
that to permit settlement of cross-claims in interpleader actions between claimants
of different states -would be an extension of jurisdiction.
I In the Federal Constitution it is an implicit rather than express doctrine. The
North Carolina Constitution has an express provision: "The legislative, executive,
and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other." N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §8.
2Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796). See Field, The Doctrine of
Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. Ray. 485 (1924).
'The fact that a case has been labelled non-justiciable as involving a "political
question" does not necessarily mean that a partisan political struggle is intimately
involved in that case. For example, it is extremely doubtful that party politics
was involved in the case which led the court to say that it is up to Congress to
determine the end of a war. See Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d
[Vol. 29
